Four Years Too Late: Somalia Suddenly Discovers Meritocracy

By Ahmed A. Yusuf

Four years after taking office, and with its mandate drawing to a close, the Federal Government of Somalia has suddenly discovered the virtues of meritocrac y . Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has ordered federal ministries and government agencies to begin filling senior civil-service positions through open competition, with appointments supposedly based on competence, education, experience, leadership and performance.

The first phase of the exercise is scheduled to begin on September 20 and will focus on departmental directors. The process is then expected to extend to director-general positions across government institutions. The announcement would ordinarily be welcomed as a long-overdue step toward building a professional state.

But the timing is impossible to ignore. Why did a government that had four years to institutionalize merit-based recruitment wait until the closing stages of its mandate to announce that qualified Somalis should finally have an equal opportunity to compete for government jobs?

That is the question many citizens are likely to ask. A functioning civil service cannot be built by issuing reform directives when a government’s term is nearly over. Meritocracy is supposed to be the operating principle of government—not an election-season promise.

The extraordinary timing

Prime Minister Hamza says the government has spent the past four years establishing the legal and institutional foundations for public-sector reform, including laws, policies, regulations and organizational structures governing government institutions and civil servants.

He has now instructed the Civil Service Commission to oversee an open competitive process and ensure that qualified civil servants receive equal opportunities to compete for vacant positions. There is nothing controversial about that principle.

What is controversial is the apparent gap between what the government is now promising and what critics say has characterized appointments during its tenure.

The Hassan Sheikh Mohamud administration has faced persistent criticism over allegations of nepotism, political patronage, clan-based considerations and the concentration of important government positions among politically connected individuals. Such allegations should be assessed against actual appointment records rather than political rhetoric.

But if the government genuinely intends to introduce a merit-based system, it should have little difficulty demonstrating how senior appointments were made over the preceding four years. That is where the public deserves transparency.

Where was meritocracy before?

The question is particularly uncomfortable because the principle being announced today is not a new constitutional invention. Somalia has been struggling for decades to establish a professional, politically neutral and competent public administration. Competitive recruitment is among the most basic requirements of such a system.

Yet critics argue that under the current administration, access to senior state positions has too often been influenced by political relationships, family connections and clan considerations. The allegations extend beyond civilian ministries. The same questions have been raised about senior positions within the security and military establishment, where professionalism and competence should be even less negotiable.

If family members and political allies of those in power are perceived to occupy influential positions throughout government and the security sector, then simply announcing an open competition for departmental directors at the end of the government’s mandate will inevitably invite skepticism.

The public is entitled to ask whether this is genuine institutional reform—or an attempt to rewrite the government’s record before it leaves office.

The corruption contradiction

The announcement also comes at an extraordinary moment for Somalia’s international reputation. According to Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Somalia scored just 9 out of 100, placing it among the countries with the lowest scores globally for perceived public-sector corruption. The index measures perceptions of public-sector corruption based on assessments by experts and businesspeople.

Against that backdrop, the government cannot reasonably expect the public to be satisfied with declarations alone. A country struggling at the bottom of global corruption rankings needs institutions that are visibly transparent, independently accountable and resistant to political interference.

It needs recruitment systems in which a highly qualified Somali with no political connections can compete on equal terms with someone who has access to the corridors of power. It needs a security establishment where promotion is determined by professional achievement rather than political loyalty or family connections. And it needs appointments that can survive public scrutiny.

The family-and-patronage question

Perhaps the most sensitive issue is whether the government is prepared to apply the same standards to its own political establishment. If meritocracy is now the principle, then it should apply universally.

The public should be able to examine the qualifications and appointment processes of senior officials. It should be possible to determine whether relatives and close associates of senior political figures have received government positions, and under what procedures.

If those appointments were made through transparent, competitive and lawful procedures, the government should have no reason to fear scrutiny. If they were not, the government should explain why. That is the essence of institutional accountability.

A civil service is not a political reward system

The danger of politicized recruitment goes far beyond individual appointments. When government jobs become rewards for political loyalty, institutions gradually lose their independence. Qualified professionals become discouraged. Competent officials may find themselves competing against people whose principal qualification is proximity to power.

Eventually, the state itself suffers. The consequences are visible in weak institutions, poor service delivery, corruption, declining public confidence and an administrative culture in which personal connections can become more valuable than professional qualifications. Somalia cannot build a modern state on that foundation.

The Prime Minister’s real test

Prime Minister Hamza’s directive therefore creates an opportunity—but also a test. If the government is serious about meritocracy, it should publish the vacancies, qualifications, selection criteria and competitive procedures. It should make the process independently verifiable and ensure that unsuccessful candidates have appropriate avenues for appeal.

Most importantly, the government should demonstrate that the rules apply equally to the politically powerful and the politically powerless. The public should not have to take another government promise on faith. After four years in office, citizens have every right to ask: Where was this merit-based system when the government first took power? Why is it being introduced now? How many senior positions were filled through genuine open competition during the past four years? How many appointments involved political, family or clan considerations?

And perhaps the most important question of all: Will the same standards now being promised apply to the people closest to the centres of power?

Somalia needs evidence, not slogans

There is nothing wrong with a government deciding to professionalize its civil service. On the contrary, Somalia desperately needs a competent, accountable and politically neutral public administration. But after four years, the announcement inevitably raises eyebrows.

A government cannot spend most of its mandate operating under one set of political realities and then, as its term approaches its end, present the introduction of competitive recruitment as though it were the beginning of a new era.

The Somali public is more sophisticated than that. It understands the difference between reform announced and reform implemented. It understands that meritocracy cannot exist alongside unchecked patronage. And it understands that a professional government is measured not by the speeches of its leaders but by the transparency of its institutions.

If the Hassan administration truly wants to leave behind a professional civil service, it has an opportunity to prove it. But after four years, the burden of proof is no longer on the public to believe the promise. It is on the government to demonstrate that the promise is real. Somalia has heard enough declarations about reform. Now it needs receipts.

Ahmed A. Yusuf Email: [email protected]