Authoritarian Legalism in Somalia, Part III: When the Guardians of the Law Serve the Ruler
What happened
Single source · Wardheer News
The article discusses the actions of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in removing the Chief Justice and the implications of the Office of the State Attorney General's statements regarding the judiciary.
What else the report says
- ProposalIf the judgment were void, there would be nothing to challenge; if a challenge were needed, the judgment would stand until a court said otherwise.
- Decision reportedIn its ruling on November 5, the Court accepted the first argument, so it never decided whether the amendments had been properly adopted.
- What happens nextA government whose lawyers will not tell it where the law stops has turned them into willing instruments of authoritarian legalism.
- Part II of this series described four days in November in which Hassan Sheikh Mohamud removed the Chief Justice , ignored the Supreme Court’s judgment that his term had ended, and swore in his party’s lawyer to lead the Court, placing the judiciary’s leadership in the service of authoritarian legalism.
- Why it matters
- The article highlights concerns about the integrity of the judiciary in Somalia and the implications of authoritarian legalism on governance.
- Still unclear
- What are the potential consequences of these actions for the judiciary in Somalia?

More from this report
Key points
- Hassan Sheikh Mohamud removed the Chief Justice and ignored the Supreme Court’s judgment that his term had ended.
- The Office of the State Attorney General (OSAG) issued a statement on November 6.
- OSAG declared the Supreme Court’s decision ‘the so-called judgment’ and promised legal action.
Original report with a saved translation · English
English · Machine translated · Not human reviewed
Original source text
By Isha Qarsoon
Part II of this series described four days in November in which Hassan Sheikh Mohamud removed the Chief Justice , ignored the Supreme Court’s judgment that his term had ended, and swore in his party’s lawyer to lead the Court, placing the judiciary’s leadership in the service of authoritarian legalism. Each step took a legal form: first a decree, then an oath.
This essay looks at the officials who fell in line, through three statements that followed: the November 6 statement of the Office of the State Attorney General (OSAG), the Justice Ministry’s reply to UN human rights experts, and a statement issued in the name of Somali judges.
In a constitutional government, the government’s lawyers tell the ruler where the law stops and what it forbids. Under authoritarian legalism, they do the opposite: they give his acts the form of law, so that what the law forbids appears to be what it permits. This essay measures the three statements against that standard.
The title of OSAG misleads. In Somali, the office is “Xafiiska Garyaqaanka Guud ee Dowladda,” the office of the government’s general lawyer.
It is not the prosecutor general, who is the Xeer-Ilaaliyaha Guud, and it is not a court of law. Law No.
18 of 1976, which created OSAG, lists its duties: to advise the government, to represent and defend it in court, to prepare or take part in agreements and draft laws, to mediate disputes between organs of the state, to manage the archive and the Official Gazette, and to research the law. In constitutional cases, the 2016 Constitutional Court law adds one more duty: to protect the public interest and adherence to the Constitution (Article 27).
None of these duties gives OSAG any power over a court’s judgment. In Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s case it was a party’s lawyer, with no more authority over the result than Sharif’s own counsel.
When Sharif challenged the 2026 amendments in October, OSAG answered for the government. It never argued that Parliament had followed the amendment procedure.
Instead, it argued only that the Court should not hear the case: that Sharif had no right to bring it, that the Court had no power to hear it, and that the 2026 Constitution could not be challenged at all. The last is the argument authoritarian legalism needs most.
An amendment no court can review can change anything, including how long rulers stay in office, and Sharif was asking only whether the required procedure had been followed. The Court accepted the first argument, rejected the second, and did not answer the third.
In its ruling on November 5, the Court accepted the first argument, so it never decided whether the amendments had been properly adopted. It rejected the second and did not answer the third.
The Court also held that the terms of Parliament, the government and the president had expired. The next day OSAG dismissively called the Supreme Court’s decision ‘the so-called judgment’, declared it of no legal effect, and promised legal action without naming a court.
OSAG’s declaration did what authoritarian legalism asks of a government lawyer: it gave the president’s refusal to accept the judgment the colour of law. Even if some of OSAG’s complaints about the Court’s procedure have merit, none gives a party’s lawyer the power it claimed.
The law expects courts to make mistakes and provides remedies for them. For instance, a lower court’s ruling can be appealed to a higher court.
However, the Supreme Court is the highest court, so a party that believes its final judgment is flawed can only ask the Supreme Court itself to revisit it, on the grounds the Civil Procedure Code allows. A party with complaints about judges can take them to the Judicial Service Commission, the body the government itself has never completed.
OSAG used neither, and it is neither: it is not a court and not the Commission. The only court that could hear a challenge to the judgment is the one whose judgment OSAG had declared void.
OSAG’s declaration that the judgment has no legal effect has itself no legal effect. No law lets a party’s lawyer annul a judgment, so the statement was void the moment it was issued. The judgment stands, and with it the Court’s finding that the terms of Parliament, the government and the president have expired.
The promise of “appropriate legal action” is no better. No legal action can do what it implies: no court sits above the Supreme Court, and the Court itself can revisit its judgment only on narrow grounds such as fraud or newly found evidence, none of which OSAG claimed.
If the judgment were void, there would be nothing to challenge; if a challenge were needed, the judgment would stand until a court said otherwise. Since the only court available is the one whose judgment OSAG had rejected, the promise could only be read as aimed at the judges, who by then had lost their guards and, by the Chief Justice’s account, been barred from leaving the country.
Coming after the defence minister’s warning, it read as a threat. No such action has been reported.
Not even the Attorney General, who alone could ask the Court to revisit its judgment because he had been left out of the case, could declare it void; only the Court could. An office that represents the government in court as its daily work knows that a party’s lawyer cannot annul a court’s decision, and that no such remedy exists.
It made the promise anyway, to please those in power.
The statement was written to look like law. It came on official letterhead from an office whose title sounds like the country’s highest legal authority. It cited articles of the Civil Procedure Code and the Constitutional Court law. It promised legal action, as if the state’s lawyer would soon correct the Court’s mistake. Some news reports presented it as the government’s legal rejection of the ruling, and one site reported that the office had “annulled” the judgment.
That was the statement’s evident purpose: to make people believe the Court’s judgment had been annulled. It changed nothing in law. The next day the president swore in a new Chief Justice and could present it as the lawful act of a government whose own legal office had already dismissed the judgment. Part I of this series described authoritarian legalism as the use of lawmaking, legal interpretation and selective enforcement to keep incumbents in power. OSAG supplied the interpretation.
Two days after Suleiman’s oath, the Justice Minister and ministry officials sat with him and the few Supreme Court judges who attended, at a meeting the state news agency said was held to improve the performance of the judiciary. The agency reported that Suleiman stressed judicial independence. Either a former Chief Justice does not understand what the words mean, or he uses them to cover their absence.
The purported annulment of the Supreme Court judgment did not go unanswered. Members of Parliament called on the president to respect the Court’s ruling, and opposition leaders called the removal a coup.
The Uganda Law Society urged the president to respect the Supreme Court, the African Judges and Jurists Forum criticised the removal, and on November 12 UN human rights experts condemned it as unlawful and called for Baashe’s reinstatement. The Justice Ministry’s reply to the UN experts the same day changed OSAG’s tone but not its claim.
Written for a foreign audience, it spoke of procedure, dialogue and “lawful and institutional means,” dropped OSAG’s appeal to the national interest and promised no pressure on any judge. But it adopted OSAG’s conclusion that the judgment was “null and void and without legal effect,” adding that the “former Chief Justice” had announced it after his removal.
Baashe did not preside or sign; five judges did, with the Deputy Chief Justice presiding, as the law allows. The ministry’s case against the judgment rests on that error. The reply also conceded what critics at home and abroad had said: the president did not follow the constitution’s removal procedure. The ministry said Baashe was removed “through the transitional process by which he was first nominated,” the same decree that had appointed him, because the High Council of the Judiciary has not been established. It cited no provision for that process.
The same day, a “Somali Judges Forum,” sharing its name with the monthly judges’ forum the ministry’s judicial affairs department lists among its own functions, answered the African jurists in the ministry’s own language. A ministry that convenes the judges’ forum, sits in on the Supreme Court’s meetings and speaks for the government against the Court’s judgment treats the Supreme Court as one more office the executive controls. A void statement had become the state’s official account, repeated abroad and echoed in the name of judges.
OSAG argues before the courts as its daily work. It knows that a party’s lawyer cannot annul a final judgment and that a challenge needs a court to hear it. Its duty was to tell the president that the judgment bound him. Instead it wrote the statement the president needed, telling him and the public that the ruling did not bind him.
A government whose lawyers will not tell it where the law stops has turned them into willing instruments of authoritarian legalism. The presidency’s notice removing the Chief Justice cited no legal provision, as the Court pointed out, and the man appointed in his place had been the president’s special legal adviser.
A government lawyer who loses a case and declares the judgment void tells every official that judgments are optional. Ministries, the police and regional administrations now hold a statement from the state’s legal office saying the Supreme Court’s ruling has no effect. Citizens who go to court against the government are told that winning may not be enough. And investors and partners who sign agreements with the government rely on the same office to tell them what Somali law requires.
A capable government lawyer is one of the few restraints Somalia has inside the executive. It can tell the president, before he acts, that the law forbids what he plans, and after he loses, that the judgment binds him. In November OSAG did the opposite. Its statement was void on arrival, but it was written to persuade the public that a government ignoring its highest court was obeying the law. Out of obedience, not ignorance, the State Attorney General has become a willing instrument for building authoritarian legalism.
Isha Qarsoon
Email: [email protected]
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Isha Qarsoon is a platform for Somali governance, law, and political science.
Context and open questions
Reader briefing
Article context
What happened
- The article discusses the actions of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in removing the Chief Justice and the implications of the Office of the State Attorney General's statements regarding the judiciary.
Key claims
- Hassan Sheikh Mohamud removed the Chief Justice and ignored the Supreme Court’s judgment that his term had ended.
- The Office of the State Attorney General (OSAG) issued a statement on November 6.
- OSAG declared the Supreme Court’s decision ‘the so-called judgment’ and promised legal action.
- The Supreme Court held that the terms of Parliament, the government, and the president had expired.
Source limitations
- The article does not provide responses from the parties being criticized.
- Claims are based on statements from the Office of the State Attorney General and the Supreme Court without independent verification.
- The article lacks details on the broader context of the legal situation in Somalia.
Reader takeaway
The actions of the government raise significant questions about the rule of law in Somalia.
What remains unclear
- What are the potential consequences of these actions for the judiciary in Somalia?
- How will the international community respond to these developments?
- What legal recourse is available for those challenging the government's actions?
Why it matters
The article highlights concerns about the integrity of the judiciary in Somalia and the implications of authoritarian legalism on governance.
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This is a single source report from Warkasta’s monitored network. The source link remains available so you can read the publisher’s original context.
- Source count
- 1
- Sources used
- Wardheer News
- Language mix
- English
- Translation status
- Shown in its original language
- AI synthesis
- No AI synthesis is used for this story panel
Signals used: somalia · diplomacy · diplomacy · legalism · part