Ethiopia’s Sea Ambition Exposes Somalia’s Strategic Weakness

Addis Ababa (WDN) — The paradox reshaping the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia has no coastline, yet Ethiopian forces have spent more than a decade operating inside Somalia, while Somalia—with one of Africa’s longest coastlines—still depends heavily on foreign forces for its security.

Now Ethiopia is openly demanding access to the sea. The juxtaposition exposes more than a dispute over ports. It lays bare the extraordinary imbalance between Somalia’s geographic advantage and its limited state capacity—at a moment when the waters off its coast are becoming increasingly valuable to regional and global powers.

Former Ethiopian parliament speaker Abadula Gemeda has reinforced Addis Ababa’s position, declaring that nobody can permanently prevent Ethiopia from obtaining access to the sea. “It is impossible to keep Ethiopia isolated from the sea,” Abadula told the Ethiopian News Agency.

His remarks reflect a position increasingly echoed by Ethiopia’s leadership: maritime access is being treated as a long-term national interest, not simply a commercial convenience.

For Somalia, that creates an uncomfortable strategic question: How can a country with a vast coastline exercise maximum leverage over its maritime assets when it has struggled for years to provide security across its own territory?

Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambition

Ethiopia lost its direct access to the sea after Eritrea became independent in 1993. Since then, much of its international trade has depended on ports in Djibouti.

Abadula argued that Ethiopia’s loss of its former coastline was never adequately subjected to national debate or a sufficient legal process. He said decisions of enormous consequence were taken by a limited number of actors when Ethiopia lacked a fully developed constitutional system. Those are Abadula’s historical and political interpretations, rather than independently established conclusions.

The strategic message, however, is unmistakable: Ethiopia does not intend to accept its landlocked status as an unquestionable permanent condition.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has again pledged to pursue maritime access through negotiation and mutual benefit. President Taye Atske Selassie has likewise said Addis Ababa will intensify efforts to secure access, citing economic and strategic interests.

The Somalia Paradox

The Ethiopian campaign takes on added significance because of Somalia’s security dependence. Ethiopian troops have operated inside Somalia for more than a decade through bilateral arrangements and regional and African Union-backed missions, principally in efforts to combat Al-Shabaab and support Somali security institutions.

Their presence reflects a broader reality: Somalia has struggled to build a security apparatus capable of independently controlling its territory. That creates a striking strategic imbalance.

Somalia possesses a coastline along the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, giving it access to some of the world’s most strategically important maritime routes. Yet its government has repeatedly required substantial external military support to maintain security.

This does not establish that Ethiopia’s military presence is connected to its maritime ambitions. Nor does it prove that Addis Ababa intends to exploit Somalia’s vulnerabilities.

But it does illustrate the difference between possessing strategic geography and possessing the state capacity to turn that geography into leverage.

Mogadishu’s Offer

The Somali government has said it is not opposed to Ethiopia obtaining commercial access to Somali ports, provided any agreement is reached through formal negotiations and respects Somalia’s sovereignty.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has said Somalia could allow Ethiopia to use two or three Somali ports for imports and exports.

Mogadishu has also said Addis Ababa has yet to submit a formal request clearly defining the maritime access it seeks. That distinction matters.

Commercial port access is not the same as territorial sovereignty, permanent control or military access. For Somalia, the challenge is to establish exactly what Ethiopia wants and negotiate from a position that protects sovereignty while extracting meaningful economic and strategic benefits.

A Regional Power Struggle

The maritime dispute is unfolding alongside growing competition involving Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan.

Abadula accused Egypt and other countries he described as Ethiopia’s historical adversaries of supporting forces opposed to Addis Ababa, including Eritrean and TPLF movements. Those allegations are his own and were not supported by new evidence in the interview.

The claims come against the backdrop of continuing Ethiopian-Egyptian tensions over the Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Somalia’s increasingly close relations with Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan have added another layer to the regional competition, particularly over Red Sea security and maritime affairs.

Ethiopia has responded by emphasizing what it calls its legitimate interests as a landlocked country. The result is a maritime question that is becoming entangled with a much larger contest for influence across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

Somalia’s Strategic Test

For Somalia, the dilemma is profound. Ethiopia is a powerful neighbour whose forces have played an important role in Somalia’s security for years. At the same time, Somalia controls a coastline whose ports and maritime position are becoming increasingly valuable.

Somalia has the geography. Ethiopia has the economic and military weight. The challenge for Mogadishu is to ensure that geography translates into bargaining power.

That requires more than diplomatic declarations. It requires functioning institutions, capable national security forces, political cohesion and the ability to exercise effective authority over the territory surrounding the country’s strategic ports.

Ethiopia says it wants a negotiated and mutually beneficial maritime arrangement. Somalia says it is open to commercial access while insisting on sovereignty and formal government-to-government negotiations.

Those positions do not necessarily have to collide. But the underlying imbalance cannot be ignored. A country cannot fully capitalize on its coastline while remaining dependent on foreign forces to secure significant parts of its territory.

Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has therefore exposed an uncomfortable truth about Somalia. The country with the coastline still has to build the state capacity needed to protect, negotiate and profit from it. Until then, Somalia’s greatest geographic asset may remain its greatest unrealized strategic opportunity.

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