International Intervention Comes Too Late: Somalia’s Political Crisis Has Passed the Point of Diplomatic Rescue

By Mohamed A Yasin

The international community is finally stepping up diplomatic efforts to resolve Somalia’s escalating electoral crisis. But for many Somalis, the intervention comes far too late. The United States, Britain, Türkiye and the European Union have agreed to facilitate talks between the Federal Government and opposition groups, with meetings scheduled in Mogadishu from November 14 to 18.

The question, however, is not whether international mediation is necessary. It is whether it can still achieve anything meaningful after months of political confrontation, constitutional manipulation, institutional erosion and a growing breakdown in relations between the federal government and member states.

For many Somalis, this diplomatic initiative would have carried real weight had it come in April 2026, when there was still an opportunity to prevent the country from sliding into its present predicament. Instead, the international community watched as the political crisis deepened, federal institutions were weakened and the constitutional dispute became increasingly entrenched. Now, with the country approaching a dangerous political and security fragmentation, Western diplomats appear to be attempting to rescue a process they failed to protect when intervention could have made a difference.

Diplomats arrive after the damage has been done

The proposed talks are expected to focus on reaching agreement over the electoral framework and establishing a mutually acceptable mechanism for managing the transition. The diplomatic initiative, led by the United States, Britain, Türkiye and the EU — collectively referred to as the Quartet — is expected to include discussions on the principles of an agreement, meetings between political leaders and consultations among technical committees.

The mediators are also considering security arrangements for Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, with countries maintaining troops in Somalia reportedly being asked to assume responsibility for their protection. Yet the political reality confronting the mediators is considerably more complicated than the language of diplomatic communiqués suggests.

South West State is already engulfed in political and security turmoil. Hirshabelle appears increasingly vulnerable to a similar confrontation. Jubaland and Puntland have effectively been outside the federal political consensus, leaving the country’s federal compact dangerously fractured. With relations between Mogadishu and most federal member states severely strained, it is difficult to see how a few days of diplomatic meetings can restore a political arrangement that has been steadily dismantled.

What, precisely, do international mediators expect to negotiate when the very parties whose consent is essential to a functioning federation have lost confidence in the federal leadership?

The international community watched as the crisis unfolded

The greatest source of public frustration is not merely the deepening political instability in Somalia, but the fact that Somalis themselves have played a central role in driving the country toward this predicament , compounded by the apparent indifference of international partners despite increasingly unmistakable warning signs.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud pursued constitutional amendments without the broad political consensus required for such a consequential national undertaking. His administration proceeded with the formation and operation of its own electoral commission while the legitimacy of the proposed electoral arrangements remained fiercely contested. The opposition repeatedly raised objections, and federal member states challenged the direction of the process.

Yet international representatives continued to participate in political engagements that gave the appearance of normality, even as the foundations of political agreement were crumbling.

The contrast is difficult to ignore. While the constitutional order was being contested and the electoral process was moving ahead without an agreed national framework, international diplomats appeared more comfortable managing meetings than confronting the political consequences of unilateral decisions. Their failure to exert timely and meaningful pressure has now left them with considerably less diplomatic leverage.

Institutions weakened, security forces politicized

The crisis extends beyond the electoral dispute. Serious concerns have been raised about the independence of the judiciary , the use of state security institutions against political opponents and allegations of civilian casualties and displacement during government security operations.

The Supreme Court’s November 5 ruling has further complicated the political landscape. According to the report, the court rejected the extension of the presidential and parliamentary mandates and limited the prime minister’s government to routine administrative functions. The ruling has also placed the responsibility on the relevant parties to reach agreement on an electoral framework by December 5, 2026.

The conduct of the national security forces has become another source of controversy. Critics accuse President Hassan’s administration of turning institutions established to protect the country into instruments of political survival. Allegations of the use of Somali National Army personnel in operations that have resulted in civilian deaths, displacement and intimidation of political opponents raise fundamental questions about civilian protection, military professionalism and the political neutrality of the armed forces.

A national army cannot command public confidence if citizens increasingly perceive it as serving the political interests of an incumbent rather than defending the constitution and the population.

The concentration of political authority, the weakening of institutional checks and the alleged deployment of state power against opponents have led critics to describe the presidency as increasingly resembling an unaccountable monarchy rather than a constitutional democratic institution.

A diplomatic process without political leverage

The Quartet is also entering this process at a moment of heightened security uncertainty. Concerns over a possible withdrawal of Ugandan troops operating under a bilateral arrangement with Somalia, combined with the possibility that Al-Shabaab could exploit security gaps, add urgency to an already deteriorating situation.

But security concerns cannot substitute for political legitimacy. Nor can the threat of Al-Shabaab be used to justify the exclusion of political stakeholders or the concentration of power in the presidency.

The international community has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity. Those declarations, however, ring increasingly hollow when the country’s federal political arrangements are under such severe strain.

The central weakness of the current diplomatic initiative is that it appears to treat the crisis as a disagreement that can be resolved through another round of negotiations. In reality, Somalia is confronting a much deeper breakdown of trust, constitutional legitimacy and federal cooperation.

Diplomatic mediation requires leverage, credibility and the willingness to hold all parties accountable. The Quartet’s ability to deliver an agreement is now constrained by the very developments it failed to address when they were still reversible.

The Somali public has lost faith in last-minute diplomacy

For ordinary Somalis, the latest diplomatic initiative is unlikely to inspire much confidence. Many believe the international community stood by as the country drifted towards institutional collapse and is now presenting itself as a mediator after much of the damage has already been done.

The Somali public has seen this diplomatic pattern before: expressions of concern, carefully worded statements, meetings behind closed doors and declarations of support for dialogue, followed by little meaningful change on the ground.

The December 5 deadline for reaching an electoral agreement and the 90-day period for holding elections, ending on February 3, 2027, leave little room for political maneuvering. Yet deadlines alone cannot manufacture consensus where trust has collapsed.

The uncomfortable truth is that the international community may have exhausted much of its diplomatic capital. Its intervention would have been far more meaningful in April 2026, before unilateral constitutional changes, competing electoral arrangements and the breakdown of federal relations brought Somalia to its current predicament.

Today, the Quartet risks becoming an audience to another round of political theatre rather than an effective guarantor of a national settlement.

Somalia does not need more diplomatic performances. It needs a credible commitment to constitutionalism, genuine federal power-sharing, independent institutions and an electoral agreement accepted by all major political stakeholders.

The international community had an opportunity to help prevent this crisis. It failed to act decisively when that opportunity existed. Whether it can now reverse the consequences is another question entirely. For many Somalis, the answer is already clear: the diplomats have arrived, but the moment for meaningful intervention may have passed.

Mohamed A Yasin

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