Will Ethiopia Rescue Its Statehood from the Ongoing Destruction?

In recent days, international media has been extensively discussing the renewed conflicts in northern Ethiopia and the mobilization of forces opposing the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Therefore, to fully understand this situation, it is essential to look into the underlying reasons for the recurring conflicts in that country.

This article, which explains this issue, argues that Ethiopia's problem is rooted in a historical distortion present in the foundation of the country's statehood. This distortion began during the time of the Abyssinian Empire, after many lands and peoples in the east, west, and south of Ethiopia were forcibly incorporated into the empire.

This article refutes the public narrative propagated by the Abyssinian Empire, which claims: Ethiopia is a country with a legitimate statehood based on unity. This argument is a political one aimed at legitimizing and recognizing the statehood that violently seized the diverse peoples living in what is now known as Ethiopia during the 19th century.

Most historians agree that Ethiopia's statehood did not arise from a social contract in which the peoples of that country participated collectively. Instead, it emerged from the Abyssinian Empire led by the Amhara and Tigray, who forcibly took control of the various peoples living in the east, west, and south of present-day Ethiopia. This imperial approach, which began during the time of the empire, transitioned into the modern states that subsequently governed Ethiopia.

The administrations of Haile Selassie (1930–1974), the Derg (1974–1991), and the EPRDF, led by the TPLF (1991–2018), were different in their systems and political ideologies, yet they all shared the view that the country should be governed by a strong central government. This power-centric policy led to historical grievances, political inequality, and ongoing disputes about who holds power in the country and how it is managed.

The populations that particularly felt the burden of these systems include the Oromos, who, according to the 2007 census, accounted for approximately 34% of the country's population, making them the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. The Oromo ethnic group has long been engaged in a struggle related to how to free themselves from the oppression and pressure they faced from the centralized government led by the Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups.

This struggle, which had both a political and armed wing, eventually transformed into a popular uprising that erupted in the Oromia region, ultimately leading to Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigning in February 2018. It was followed by Abiy Ahmed taking power in April of the same year, becoming the first Oromo prime minister. The Oromos viewed this as a historic victory; however, on the other hand, there was a challenge arising from the fact that the government led by the Oromos was based on the concept of Abyssinia, which historically and ancestrally had no connection to the Oromos.

However, Abiy's administration initially took steps indicating political openness that were widely welcomed both domestically and internationally. Thousands of prisoners were released, restrictions on opposition parties were lifted, and the long-standing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was ended. But in 2019, the country's political direction changed after Abiy dismantled the EPRDF coalition, which consisted of four ethnic groups, and replaced it with a single party called the Prosperity Party.

This decision sparked opposition from various sides with different agendas. Many within the Oromo community viewed Abiy as deviating from ethnic federalism towards a strong central government. On the other hand, the Amhara and Tigray saw this change as a plan by Abiy to establish a powerful central government dominated by the Oromos, but cloaked in Ethiopian nationalism.

The TPLF administration, which was the most powerful among the ethnic groups united under the EPRDF, opposed the direction Abiy was taking the country's politics, leading to their political, economic, and military power relocating to Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. Ultimately, this conflict escalated into an open war on November 4, 2020, and federal forces captured Mekelle shortly thereafter.

In the war that Abiy fought in Tigray, he was allied with the Amhara and Eritrea, each having their own specific objectives. The Amhara wanted to regain control of Western Tigray, which they viewed as historically their land, but which the Tigray administration of Ethiopia had incorporated into the Tigray region. Similarly, Eritrea sought to weaken the TPLF, which had long been its greatest enemy.

Following widespread death and displacement resulting from the Tigray war, Abiy and the TPLF signed a peace agreement in November 2022 in the city of Pretoria. The Pretoria agreement halted the ongoing war, but it did not resolve the root causes of the conflict, due to various reasons, the most significant being the mistrust between Addis Ababa and Mekelle. This hindered the implementation of the agreement's provisions, such as the disarmament of Tigray forces.

The implementation of the Pretoria agreement was also obstructed by the Amhara and Eritrea, who were not involved in the agreement and viewed it as a threat to their interests. The suspicions of the Amhara and Eritrea were further fueled by Abiy's decision to disband the regional special forces, including those of the Amhara, and integrate them into the federal forces, along with his statements that Ethiopia should secure a maritime route, whether through peace or conflict.

The division and distrust among various parties ultimately led to the announcement on September 20, 2026, by seven opposition groups forming an alliance against the Addis Ababa government. These groups include the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Armed Movements (Fano), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). However, significant questions remain regarding the unity and sustainability of this alliance, as the groups involved have conflicting interests and historical disputes that have yet to be resolved.

For instance, the Oromos, even those who strongly oppose Abiy Ahmed, do not seem to easily support a regime led by Oromos being overthrown by a rebellion led by the Amhara and Tigray. Similarly, the Amhara and Tigray are still divided by political struggles over national leadership and land disputes that have yet to find lasting solutions. Therefore, although these parties have temporarily united against the Addis Ababa government, their historical conflicts may pose a challenge to the alliance's unity.

In conclusion, the wars and political turmoil in Ethiopia are not sudden events arising from today's conflicts; they are a significant part of a historical legacy that has been ongoing since the Abyssinian Empire. The structure of Ethiopia has led to political, economic, and social grievances, which have given rise to political and armed movements, the most prominent being the political uprising led by the Oromos, which resulted in Abiy Ahmed seizing power.

} However, the hope that Abiy would lead a change has faded, after his government reverted to the idea of a strong central government that suppresses the country by force. This has created disappointment among parts of Oromia, who see that Abiy has deviated from the federal system based on ethnicities, while the Amhara, Tigray, and other groups have also been disappointed by the hope for an open democratic government based on a broadly agreed political agreement.

Ultimately, if a new Ethiopia based on a political agreement that different ethnic groups jointly agree on issues of national destiny, such as power-sharing, federalism, and the governance of the country, is not achieved, it seems that the recurring conflicts will lead the country to an irretrievable political and state collapse.

WQ: Bashiir Maxamed Cali

Political analyst