Six Judges Go to Arusha: The East African Court Case, a Broken Bench, and the Risk of No Return
What happened
Single source · Wardheer News
On 18 November, six judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court filed a case against the Federal Government at the East African Court of Justice in Arusha, claiming attacks on judicial independence.
What else the report says
- ProposalA loss in Arusha would do two things at once.
- Decision reportedFormer President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed had challenged two things: the way the 2026 constitutional amendments were passed, and the effect of those amendments on the terms of the President and Parliament.
- What happens nextAny attempt now to appoint further judges to fill the empty seats will face the same difficulty.
- On 18 November the East African Court of Justice in Arusha issued a formal notice .
- Why it matters
- This case represents a significant challenge to the Federal Government's authority and could impact the judicial independence in Somalia.
- Still unclear
- What specific actions by the government are being cited as attacks on judicial independence?

More from this report
Key points
- Six judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court have filed a case against the Federal Government.
- The Attorney General has 45 days to reply to the case.
- The judges argue that the government has attacked judicial independence.
Original report with a saved translation · English
English · Machine translated · Not human reviewed
Original source text
By Farah Mire
On 18 November the East African Court of Justice in Arusha issued a formal notice . Six judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court had filed a case against the Federal Government. The Attorney General has 45 days to reply. If he does not, the court can hear the case without him.
The six applicants include the Chief Justice, Dr Bashe Yusuf Ahmed, and five of his colleagues. They say the government has attacked judicial independence. This is not a small claim. It is the first time sitting Supreme Court judges have taken their own government to the regional court.
The timing is sharp. The Supreme Court ruled on 5 November that the President’s term ended in May and that the government can only do day-to-day work. The opposition has rejected talks called by the President. The court also ordered an electoral deal within 30 days and elections within 90 days. Now the judges themselves have gone to Arusha. Everything is connected.
What the East African Case Means
The East African Court of Justice exists to make sure Partner States follow the Treaty. Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty speak about democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. Private people and public officials can bring a case if they believe a Partner State has broken those rules.
The six judges are using that door. They argue that the attempt to remove the Chief Justice, the pressure on the court, and the refusal to accept the 5 November judgment all violate the Treaty. The government will say this is a domestic matter and that the regional court has no business inside Somalia’s constitution. That argument has been tried before. The East African Court has often held that the rule of law is not purely domestic when a Partner State has signed the Treaty.
The 45-day clock started on 18 November. A reply is due around the end of December or early January. After that, the court can set a hearing. The process is not fast, but it is real. Once a case is registered, every later step by the government becomes part of the evidence. That is the practical power of the Arusha filing.
How Similar Cases Have Fared in the East African Court
The Somali judges are not walking into an empty room. The East African Court already has clear case law on exactly this kind of dispute.
The South Sudan Judges Case
The strongest and most direct precedent is Reference No. 9 of 2017, Hon. Justice Malek Mathiang Malek against the Minister of Justice of the Republic of South Sudan.
In 2017 the President of South Sudan issued a decree dismissing 14 judges, including Justice Malek of the Court of Appeal. The judges had been involved in a strike. The President acted without the Judicial Service Council and without following the disciplinary process set out in South Sudan’s own constitution and Judiciary Act.
Justice Malek took the case to Arusha. In July 2020 the East African Court of Justice ruled in his favour. It held that the President had no power to remove judges in that way. The dismissal was an abuse of power and a direct interference with the independence of the judiciary. It violated both South Sudan’s Transitional Constitution and Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the EAC Treaty. The Court ordered the President to reinstate all the dismissed judges automatically and to pay the applicant’s costs.
That judgment sets a clear regional principle: a Partner State’s executive cannot unilaterally dismiss senior judges without following proper constitutional processes. Doing so breaches the Treaty principles of the rule of law and judicial independence.
What Happened After the Ruling
Here the picture becomes more complicated, and more relevant to Somalia. South Sudan’s government did not fully and promptly reinstate the judges. Compliance with East African Court orders has been uneven across the Community. The Court itself has repeatedly said that its authority depends not only on the quality of its judgments but on whether Partner States implement them. At the Court’s 25th anniversary events in November 2026, the President of the Court again called for stronger mechanisms to track and enforce compliance.
This mixed record matters. A strong legal principle exists. Enforcement still depends on political will, regional pressure, and the willingness of other Partner States and Community organs to treat non-compliance as a serious matter.
Other Relevant Jurisprudence
The Court has also dealt with broader challenges to constitutional processes and governance in Partner States. Cases from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania have confirmed that actions which undermine the rule of law, good governance or the independence of institutions can fall within the Treaty. The Court has been willing to examine whether domestic processes meet the standards the Partner States themselves accepted when they signed the Treaty.
Somalia is already familiar territory for the Court. Earlier references have touched on electoral processes and constitutional amendments. The Court has shown it is prepared to hear sensitive governance cases from Somalia. That background makes the current filing by the six judges less surprising and more legally grounded.
In short, the legal foundation for the Somali judges’ case is strong. The Malek precedent is almost on all fours with the facts of the Chief Justice’s removal. What remains open is not the principle, but whether the Court will apply it with the same force, and whether any eventual order will be obeyed.
The 5 November Judgment and Its Circular Logic
To understand the strength of the Arusha case, we must look again at the Supreme Court’s own decision of 5 November.
Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed had challenged two things: the way the 2026 constitutional amendments were passed, and the effect of those amendments on the terms of the President and Parliament. The Court split the claims. On the amendment process itself, it said Sharif lacked standing under Article 86 of the 2012 Provisional Constitution. That part was dismissed.
On the second claim, the Court accepted standing and went to the merits. It held that when an amendment changes the length of terms, the new length applies to sitting office-holders only if the text says so clearly.
The 2026 amendments were silent. Therefore the old four-year terms continued.
Parliament’s term ended on 14 April 2026. The President’s ended on 15 May 2026.
All acts taken after those dates under full constitutional authority were void. The government was limited to day-to-day caretaker functions.
The parties were ordered to agree an inclusive electoral framework within 30 days and hold elections within 90 days.
The structural problem in that judgment remains important. The Court dismissed the challenge to the amendment process for lack of standing. Then it used the 2026 Constitution — the very text produced by those amendments — as the source of its own power to decide the consequences. The reasoning is circular. Absence of a competent challenger was treated as positive proof that the 2026 text is operative.
This circularity is both a weakness and a strength for the six judges now in Arusha. It is a weakness because a later domestic court could try to reopen the validity of the amendments. It is a strength because the practical result — expired mandates, caretaker limits, and hard deadlines — still stands as a formal judicial order. Any government that ignores that order strengthens the claim that it is acting outside the rule of law.
Did the Government Break Its Own Constitution on the Judges?
Yes. On the available record, the government did not follow the constitutional process for removing or appointing the Chief Justice. Under the 2026 constitutional text that the government itself promotes, removal of the Chief Justice requires a proposal from the Supreme Judicial Council (or High Judicial Council) followed by approval by Parliament. Appointment of a new Chief Justice follows the same three-stage path: nomination by the Council, approval by both houses of Parliament by absolute majority, and only then a presidential decree published in the Official Gazette.
None of those steps happened in public. On 4 November the President issued a decree removing Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed. Three days later Ibrahim Idle Suleiman was sworn in. The Supreme Court itself ruled the removal null and void the next day. United Nations special rapporteurs later described the process as a “blatant interference with the independence of the judiciary” and noted the absence of any proposal from the Judicial Services Commission or parliamentary approval.
The government’s reply has been that the High Judicial Council was not yet fully established, so the same informal path used in earlier appointments was followed. That answer does not solve the problem. If the Council does not exist, the proper course is to establish it, not to invent a presidential power that the constitution does not grant. A caretaker government whose own mandate is under challenge is in an even weaker position to claim emergency powers over the judiciary.
Any attempt now to appoint further judges to fill the empty seats will face the same difficulty. The constitutional machinery for judicial appointments is either incomplete or has been bypassed. New appointees will carry a legitimacy question from the first day. Those appointments will almost certainly be placed before the East African Court as further evidence of Treaty violation.
The Broken Bench
Somalia’s Supreme Court is supposed to have nine judges. Six have gone to Arusha. That leaves three. A full bench usually needs five judges. Three is not enough for the court to sit as a proper constitutional court.
The government may try to appoint new judges. Any such appointments will themselves become part of the East African case. The six judges will say the government is packing the court to reverse the 5 November ruling. The government will say it is restoring a working judiciary. Both claims will sit on the table in Arusha.
In short, the Supreme Court is now split and incomplete. It cannot easily reverse its own earlier judgment, and it cannot easily be rebuilt without creating new legal problems.
The Risk That the Government Loses in Arusha
The President and his advisers can see the danger. A loss in the East African Court would not be a private matter. It would be a public finding by a regional court that Somalia has violated the rule of law and judicial independence under the Treaty. That finding would erode what remains of the government’s claim to constitutional authority. At the same time it would restore and strengthen the legitimacy of the six judges who filed the case.
The Malek precedent makes that risk concrete. If the Court applies the same reasoning it used in South Sudan, the logical remedy is an order to reinstate the Chief Justice and to treat the unilateral dismissal as void. That would further reinforce the Supreme Court’s 5 November findings.
What precautions can the government take?
First, it can file a careful, well-argued response within the 45 days. Silence or a dismissive reply would look like contempt and would hurt its position.
Second, it can avoid further unilateral acts against the judiciary while the case is pending. Every new pressure or irregular appointment becomes fresh evidence.
Third, it can try to open genuine political talks that accept the 5 November judgment as the starting point. A political settlement reached before the Arusha hearing would reduce the practical importance of any court order.
Fourth, it can seek support from other Partner States and from the East African Community organs. Regional political cover can slow or soften enforcement, even if it cannot erase a judgment. The mixed compliance record of the South Sudan case shows that enforcement is not automatic.
None of these steps is guaranteed to succeed. The cleaner the government’s legal record, the better its chance. The more it continues to act as if the 5 November order does not exist, the stronger the applicants’ case becomes.
If the Government Loses: Legitimacy and the Problem of No Return
A loss in Arusha would do two things at once. It would further damage the government’s claim to act with constitutional authority. And it would formally restore the standing of the six judges as the legitimate voice of the Supreme Court on the matters they decided.
That restoration matters. It would make it harder for any new domestic bench assembled by the government to reverse the 5 November deadlines. It would also give the opposition and federal member states a stronger legal platform to insist that talks start from the court’s findings.
But the deeper problem is what happens if the political system cannot return to normal. Normal would mean a working Supreme Court with a clear majority, a government whose mandate is accepted, and an agreed path to elections. None of those three things exists today.
If the government continues to govern as a caretaker while rejecting the caretaker limits, if the court remains split, and if the opposition refuses talks without full acceptance of the court order, then the country stays in a prolonged state of disputed authority. Institutions keep functioning on paper, but their decisions carry permanent question marks. International partners become more cautious. Domestic actors begin to treat every appointment, every budget line, and every security decision as temporary.
That is the real risk of “no return.” It is not a single dramatic collapse. It is a slow normalisation of contested power. Once that becomes the everyday condition, restoring a clean constitutional line becomes harder with every passing month. The experience of other Partner States with delayed or partial compliance shows how quickly a clear court order can lose practical force if politics does not follow.
The Tight Timetable
Three clocks are running at the same time.
First, the Supreme Court’s order: political agreement on an electoral framework within 30 days of 5 November, and elections within 90 days. That puts the agreement deadline in early December and the election deadline in early February.
Second, the East African Court notice: 45 days for the government to file a response. That deadline falls in early January.
Third, the political reality: the opposition has rejected the President’s calls for dialogue and wants international mediation. Talks that do not include the main opposition groups will not satisfy the Supreme Court’s demand for an inclusive process.
These three clocks do not match. A caretaker government cannot easily organise elections or redesign the electoral system. A court without a full bench cannot easily issue further guidance. International partners want talks, but the two sides do not agree on the starting point. Time is being used as a weapon by everyone.
What the President Can Do
The President’s room for manoeuvre is smaller than it looks. He can continue to reject the Supreme Court judgment and treat it as political. That keeps him in day-to-day control of the security forces and the administration. But every day that passes strengthens the argument that he is acting outside the law. The Arusha case will record that.
He can try to appoint new judges and create a new majority on the Supreme Court. That may give him a domestic legal cover. It will also hand the six judges in Arusha a clear story of court-packing. He can open real talks with the opposition and the federal member states, accepting that the 5 November judgment is the starting point. That would be the cleanest path out of the crisis, but it requires him to give up the claim that his term continues.
He can appeal to regional and international partners for support. They will not, however, want to be seen supporting a government that ignores its own highest court and faces an adverse regional judgment. The South Sudan experience shows that even a clear reinstatement order does not automatically restore the previous status quo if the executive resists. None of these options is cost-free. The least damaging one is the hardest: genuine talks on the basis of the court order.
What the Opposition Can Do
The opposition holds a strong legal card. The Supreme Court has said the mandates have expired. The six judges have taken the fight to Arusha. The Malek precedent gives them a ready-made regional argument. The opposition can insist that any talks start from those facts.
They can also overplay their hand. If they refuse every form of dialogue and wait for the government to collapse, they risk being seen as the side that blocked a solution. International partners want a deal, not a vacuum.
The smartest course is to set clear, limited conditions for talks: recognition of the court judgment as the legal baseline, a neutral venue, and a clear role for international facilitation. That keeps the moral high ground without closing the door completely.
What Civil Society Can Do
Civil society groups, professional associations, and religious leaders still have space. They can keep the focus on the court orders and the need for an inclusive electoral process. They can document pressure on judges and media. They can refuse to treat the crisis as a simple fight between two political camps.
Their influence is limited. They cannot force either side to the table. But they can raise the political cost of ignoring the courts, and they can keep the public conversation honest.
Are We Back in a Circle?
Somalia has been here before. A court speaks. The executive ignores it. The opposition hardens. Time runs out. Everyone claims the other side is playing politics. The public grows tired.
This time there are two new elements. First, the judges themselves have taken the case outside the country. That makes pure domestic point-scoring harder. Second, the Treaty obligations of the East African Community give external partners a clearer legal basis to speak. The Malek case shows the Court is willing to protect judges against unilateral executive action.
Still, the risk of another circular struggle is high. The government may try to stretch time until the Arusha case is decided. The opposition may try to stretch time until the government’s position becomes untenable. Both strategies treat the electoral clock as something that can be managed rather than respected. The mixed compliance record of earlier EACJ orders shows that a court victory does not automatically produce political change.
The 5 November judgment tried to break that circle by setting hard deadlines. The Arusha filing tries to protect the judges who issued it. Whether either step works will depend on whether enough political actors decide that the cost of ignoring the courts is higher than the cost of accepting them.
What to Watch
Five things will show the real direction in the next few weeks.
Will the government file a serious response in Arusha, or will it treat the case as illegitimate?
Will new judges be appointed, and how? Will the constitutional process for appointment be followed or bypassed again?
Will any talks restart, and on what terms?
Will the 30-day and 90-day deadlines be treated as real constraints or as suggestions
And, most important: will the political class accept that a return to normal constitutional authority requires accepting the court’s findings, or will it prefer a prolonged state of disputed power?
The six judges have moved the dispute onto a regional stage where clear precedent already exists. That does not guarantee a solution. It does make the next moves more visible and more costly. In a crisis where every side has been accused of point-scoring, visibility is not a small thing. The greater danger is not a single court loss. It is the slow acceptance that normal constitutional order is no longer available.
Farah Mire
Email: [email protected]
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Farah Mire is a political analyst writing on Somalia’s federal and constitutional crises.
Context and open questions
Reader briefing
Article context
What happened
- On 18 November, six judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court filed a case against the Federal Government at the East African Court of Justice in Arusha, claiming attacks on judicial independence. The Attorney General has 45 days to respond to the case.
Key claims
- Six judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court have filed a case against the Federal Government.
- The Attorney General has 45 days to reply to the case.
- The judges argue that the government has attacked judicial independence.
- The Supreme Court ruled on 5 November that the President’s term ended in May.
Source limitations
- The article does not provide a response from the Federal Government regarding the claims made by the judges.
- The claims about judicial independence and the government's actions are reported but not independently verified.
- The article does not include any statements from the Attorney General.
Reader takeaway
The filing of this case marks a historic moment as it is the first time sitting Supreme Court judges have taken their own government to a regional court.
What remains unclear
- What specific actions by the government are being cited as attacks on judicial independence?
- How will the government respond to the case filed by the judges?
- What implications could this case have for the future of the judiciary in Somalia?
Why it matters
This case represents a significant challenge to the Federal Government's authority and could impact the judicial independence in Somalia.
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This is a single source report from Warkasta’s monitored network. The source link remains available so you can read the publisher’s original context.
- Source count
- 1
- Sources used
- Wardheer News
- Language mix
- English
- Translation status
- Shown in its original language
- AI synthesis
- No AI synthesis is used for this story panel
Signals used: somalia · politics · politics · court · arusha
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