Terrorism knows no borders: Kenya must deny Al-Shabaab affiliates a safe haven

In August, South West State Security Minister Osman Isaaq Mohamed called on Kenya to arrest and extradite former South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen to Somalia. Mohamed alleged that forces loyal to Laftagareen had links to Al-Shabaab. Kenya has yet to publicly explain how it handled the appeal. Why has Nairobi left the question unanswered? And what does that silence say about how Kenya deals with Somalia’s federal government when a former regional leader is at the center of a dispute?

Mohamed’s allegation concerned forces loyal to Laftagareen. His appeal sought the arrest and extradition of Laftagareen himself. The distinction matters because the allegation concerns one set of actors and the requested action concerns an individual. Kenyans and Somalis are entitled to ask whether Nairobi received a formal request and how it responded. That question has stood since August.

On November 10, suspected Al-Shabaab militants ambushed eight people on their way to a road construction site in Mandera County, near the Somali border. Five were construction workers, two were police reservists, and one was their driver. The victims were traveling to work in a county where the consequences of insecurity are felt by people trying to earn a living.

Kenya knows from its own experience why the question of safe haven matters. Al-Shabaab killed 67 people at Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall in 2013.

Its attack on the DusitD2 hotel and office complex killed 21 people in 2019. In 2025, a Kenyan court sentenced two men to 30 years in prison for assisting in the DusitD2 attack.

The case showed the importance of looking at the people who help sustain a terrorist operation. Kenya’s own courts have had to reckon with that role.

Nairobi’s response when concerns about possible Al-Shabaab ties are raised on Kenyan soil is therefore a matter of public interest.

The Laftagareen case also raises a broader question about Kenya’s approach to Somalia. Why deal separately with Somali regional authorities on matters that concern the country as a whole?

Respecting Somalia’s sovereignty serves Kenya’s interests. A relationship grounded in direct dealings with the Federal Government of Somalia gives both countries a clear counterpart for decisions that carry national consequences.

Regional leaders come and go. The two countries will continue to share a border, trade with each other and deal with the effects of insecurity. Those interests call for a relationship that can endure changes in regional leadership and disagreements within Somalia.

There is also an economic reason for Nairobi to take that relationship seriously. Somalia wants better relations with its neighbors as it works to become an energy-producing country. If its energy projects advance to production, the economic activity could extend well beyond the sites where oil or gas is produced. Transport, logistics, construction and other services could all see new demand. Kenyan businesses and workers could find opportunities in those areas through a stable relationship with Somalia.

For Kenyan workers, the potential gains are practical. A construction project can create demand for technicians and equipment operators. A growing supply chain can create work for drivers, warehouse staff and logistics specialists. The scale and timing of those opportunities depend on how Somalia’s projects develop. What Kenya can shape today is the quality of the relationship it brings to that future. A country that respects Somalia’s authority over its own affairs is better placed to build lasting commercial ties with it.

The same principle applies closer to the border. The people of Mandera have a stake in decisions made in Nairobi and Mogadishu. Their ability to travel to work, move goods and keep businesses open depends in part on how the two governments manage their relationship. The costs of a strained relationship are felt first in places where people cross the border for trade and where insecurity can interrupt an ordinary working day. The benefits of a stronger relationship would reach those communities as well as businesses looking to take part in Somalia’s economic development.

Kenya has more to gain from a durable relationship with Somalia’s federal government than from separate dealings with regional administrations on national matters. That is true when the issue is security, and it will matter as Somalia seeks investment and builds its energy sector. The August appeal is a concrete test of how Nairobi approaches that relationship. A Somali security minister raised a public allegation involving Al-Shabaab and asked Kenya to act. Months later, the question remains. How did Nairobi respond, and why has it left Kenyans and Somalis waiting for an answer?

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