President Hassan sheikh’s Southwest gamble backfires

BUURHAKABA, Somalia (WDN) — President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s controversial campaign to remove former Southwest State President Abdiasis Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen is producing consequences that may be far more damaging than Mogadishu anticipated. Within a week, forces loyal to Laftagareen have reportedly captured two strategically important districts in Bay region, challenging the authority of the administration backed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

The latest setback came on Thursday, when Laftagareen-aligned forces attacked Buurhakaba, approximately 60 kilometres from Baidoa, the interim capital of Southwest State. After fierce fighting, the forces reportedly took control of the district, where federal government and Southwest State troops had previously been stationed.

Videos circulating on social media appeared to show officials from Laftagareen’s former administration in central Buurhakaba. Those officials claimed that their forces had taken control of the town. Laftagareen’s fighters also displayed individuals they said had been captured during the fighting. However, these claims could not be independently verified, and Somali federal security officials had not publicly commented on the reported takeover at the time of publication.

The situation remained tense, with competing military movements reported in and around the district. No independently verified figures were immediately available for casualties, and the whereabouts of the government-aligned forces previously stationed there remained unclear.

Buurhakaba is the second district in Bay region reportedly to have fallen to Laftagareen-loyal forces within a week. On Friday, the same forces reportedly seized Qansaxdheere, approximately 90 kilometres from Baidoa. The successive losses represent a serious challenge to the authority of the current Southwest administration and raise questions about its ability to defend territory beyond the state capital.

A military setback with national political consequences

The developments come amid escalating political and security tensions following the confrontation over Southwest State’s leadership. Laftagareen’s removal and the installation of a rival administration, backed by Mogadishu, have intensified a dispute that is increasingly being fought not only through political manoeuvring but also through armed force.

Rather than consolidating federal authority, the campaign against Laftagareen risks opening another front in an already fragmented country. If his forces continue to gain ground, the federal government could find itself spending more resources defending its political allies while struggling to demonstrate effective authority outside Mogadishu.

Southwest State has previously warned about the activities of forces loyal to Laftagareen, particularly the possibility of attacks on other towns in the state. The administration has also said that attempts to advance on Baidoa had failed. The reported capture of Qansaxdheere and Buurhakaba, however, suggests that the military balance may be more complicated than those assurances indicated.

The immediate question is whether Laftagareen’s forces can consolidate their gains and sustain pressure on Baidoa, or whether government-aligned troops will launch counteroffensives to recover the districts. For now, the absence of independently verified information about troop positions, casualties and the circumstances of the takeovers makes it difficult to determine the full military picture.

Mogadishu’s shrinking political reach

The unfolding crisis also exposes a broader problem for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud: the widening gap between the federal government’s formal claims to national leadership and its practical ability to secure political cooperation across Somalia.

Puntland and Jubaland have increasingly pursued their own political positions outside Mogadishu’s direction. Southwest State is now embroiled in an armed confrontation linked to its disputed leadership. In parts of Hirshabelle, the federal government’s influence is also contested, with Hiraan presenting particular challenges to Mogadishu’s authority. Galmudug remains an important part of the federal political landscape, but it cannot by itself compensate for deteriorating relations with other federal member states.

These divisions raise a fundamental question about the strategy of concentrating political power in the presidency while failing to secure broad agreement on constitutional arrangements, elections and the relationship between the federal government and member states.

A president’s constitutional title does not automatically translate into effective national authority. That authority depends on political legitimacy, functioning institutions, negotiated agreements and the willingness of federal member states to cooperate with the centre.

Critics of Hassan Sheikh’s approach argue that his confrontation with Laftagareen has turned a political dispute into a potentially costly security crisis. Instead of bringing Southwest State more firmly under federal influence, the intervention may have strengthened resistance to Mogadishu and encouraged further fragmentation.

The political consequences could extend beyond Bay region. If federal member states conclude that negotiations and constitutional procedures can be displaced by force whenever their leadership conflicts with the president’s preferences, trust in the federal system will deteriorate further.

The danger of governing through confrontation

Somalia’s federal arrangement was intended to distribute authority, accommodate regional interests and provide a framework for resolving disputes without returning to nationwide conflict. It cannot function effectively if disagreements over leadership are treated primarily as security problems rather than matters requiring political settlement and constitutional clarity.

The latest developments do not, by themselves, establish that Laftagareen’s forces can capture Baidoa or overturn the administration backed by Mogadishu. Nor do they prove that the federal government has lost all influence across the country. They do, however, demonstrate that the confrontation has produced serious territorial and political consequences that cannot be dismissed as isolated incidents.

For Hassan Sheikh, the strategic risk is clear: an operation intended to remove a political opponent may instead deepen opposition to his leadership, weaken an allied administration and further erode confidence in federal institutions.

The growing alienation between Mogadishu and several federal member states has also fuelled increasingly dismissive political rhetoric about the president’s reach. Some critics deride him as little more than the president of Mogadishu, while others use divisive clan-based language to question his national standing. Such labels reflect the intensity of the political dispute, not a constitutional description of his office, and risk deepening Somalia’s clan divisions.

The more consequential test, however, is not what political opponents call the president. It is whether his administration can rebuild consensus, respect constitutional procedures and persuade federal member states that their disputes with Mogadishu can be resolved through negotiation rather than coercion.

For now, the reported loss of Qansaxdheere and Buurhakaba offers a stark warning: the effort to impose political control over Southwest State may be turning into a military and political liability for the very government that initiated the confrontation. If the conflict continues to escalate, the consequences could extend well beyond Baidoa, further weakening Somalia’s already fragile federal compact.

WardheerNews