Somalia’s New Constitution and Lack of Good Faith

By Farah Mire

Good faith is the foundation of any working constitution. It means that the same rules bind everyone, including those in power. When rules are applied only when convenient, confidence collapses and institutions lose their meaning. Somalia’s current constitutional dispute is, at its heart, a test of this principle.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected in May 2022 under the Provisional Constitution for a four-year term. That term ended in May 2026.

In March 2026, Parliament approved amendments that changed the presidential term to five years. The President now relies on those amendments to remain in office until May 2027.

Earlier in the process, officials had indicated that the new rules would apply after the next election and would not extend the current mandate. That position later changed.

The same Constitution is now used to justify a longer term. If those rules are accepted as law, they must be applied fully, not selectively.

The clearest illustration of selective application is the composition of the cabinet. A large majority of ministers also sit as members of Parliament.

The Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission has ordered them to choose one role. The relevant provision is Article 81(1)(f), which prohibits dual membership of the executive and the legislature.

The transition periods provided by the Constitution have already expired. Keeping both positions after those deadlines have passed shows that the written rules are treated as optional.

This is not a minor technical issue. It is a direct test of whether the Constitution limits power or simply serves it.

The same selective approach appears at the level of the federal member states. Term extensions in Galmudug, Hirshabelle and Southwest were arranged with the federal centre despite legal questions and strong objections from opposition groups. Elections have since been held in these states. In Southwest, the Justice and Solidarity Party, linked to the President, secured a clear majority of seats and the state presidency went to a close federal ally. In Hirshabelle, the same party won 78 of 99 seats in the House of Representatives and a large majority of local council seats.

In Galmudug, after a court-ordered rerun, it won 67 of 89 assembly seats and most local council seats. These results matched earlier predictions of ruling-party dominance. Major opposition groups boycotted or were excluded from parts of the process and continue to dispute the fairness and inclusiveness of the polls. Official results have been published by the electoral commission, yet the absence of broad participation weakens any claim that these elections fully reflect constitutional good faith.

The opposition, organised mainly under the Somali Future Council, is fragile, fragmented and frustrated. The Council brings together former presidents, former prime ministers and the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland.

It has publicly rejected the March 2026 amendments as lacking consensus and has described them as illegitimate. Its members argue that the President’s term ended in May 2026 and do not recognise the five-year extension.

They have called for inclusive dialogue, international mediation and a return to negotiated rules. They have also boycotted elections in places such as Southwest State.

Yet the opposition has not turned the principle of good faith into a consistent national demand. Instead of pressing for the full and equal application of the Constitution, many of its figures focus on issues that protect their own local and clan-based interests.

They criticise the President’s selective use of rules mainly when those rules work against them, while remaining quieter when similar practices benefit their own regions or groups. Their reluctance to attack the cabinet dual-role issue has deeper roots.

Challenging the dual roles of ministers would require accepting that parts of the new Constitution are valid and must be enforced. Many opposition leaders reject the document as a whole and regard it as the product of a flawed process.

In addition, some appear reluctant to press the point because they do not wish to alienate current political leaders, including ministers and MPs, whom they may later hope to attract into their own ranks.

In Somalia’s fluid political environment, alliances shift and individuals move between camps. A public campaign against sitting ministers over dual roles could close the door to future cooperation or defections.

The result is that the opposition avoids using constitutional provisions as a tool for accountability, even when those provisions could strengthen its case. Because priorities remain localised and clannish, because hostility to the new Constitution persists, and because the possibility of later recruitment from the current political class is kept open, the opposition struggles to build a broad national argument for consistent constitutional rule.

Its objections remain loud but limited in practical effect.

Civil society faces similar constraints. Groups such as Somalia Non-State Actors have issued public statements calling for immediate political dialogue, an inclusive agreement on constitutional implementation, and a consensual electoral framework.

They have criticised the lack of broad consultation and warned that unilateral steps risk instability. Yet these organisations are often under-resourced, divided by regional and other lines, and exposed to political pressure.

They operate in a fragmented environment and have limited capacity to force consistent application of the Constitution. Public debate therefore stays narrow, and the demand for genuine accountability remains weak.

The amendments were passed by a majority in the Federal Parliament. That is a formal fact.

At the same time, important federal member states and opposition groups rejected the process as insufficiently inclusive. The gap between a parliamentary majority and broad political agreement remains real.

Somalia does not need a dramatic deadline to judge the situation. The transition periods set by the Constitution have already passed.

What matters is whether the same document used to extend a presidential term is also used to require ministers to give up dual roles and to guide state elections with greater fairness and genuine competition.

Selective application of rules erodes confidence. It suggests that the Constitution serves power rather than limits it. Restoring good faith requires consistency: the rules must bind the President, the cabinet, the states and the opposition alike. Without that consistency, frustration will grow on all sides and the gap between written law and daily practice will continue to widen.

Farah Mire