Türkiye Risks Losing Somali Public Support as Military Partnership Becomes Entangled in Political Conflict

Ankara’s plan to expand military training in 2027 may once have been welcomed as a contribution to Somalia’s security. But its perceived alignment with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and its involvement in South West State’s conflict threaten to undermine that goodwill.

MOGADISHU (WDN) — Türkiye plans to expand its training of Somali security forces in 2027, presenting the move as part of efforts to strengthen the country’s ability to defend itself and eventually assume full responsibility for national security.

According to a report by Caasimada Online, Türkiye’s Ministry of Defense said its military cooperation with Somalia includes training and equipping Somali forces. During 2026, the programme reportedly trained new recruits and officers both in Somalia and at military facilities in Türkiye.

The programme has included the Gorgor commando units and the Haramcad special police, while plans to develop Somalia’s air and naval capabilities form part of the broader defense partnership.

Yet the announcement comes at a politically sensitive moment. For a growing number of critics, the question is no longer simply how many Somali soldiers Türkiye can train, but whose interests those soldiers are ultimately being deployed to serve.

From Trusted Partner to Contested Actor

Türkiye spent years building a reputation in Somalia through humanitarian assistance, infrastructure investment, economic cooperation and military training. Its engagement was widely presented as a partnership aimed at helping Somalia rebuild institutions weakened by decades of conflict. That reputation is now under pressure.

Critics of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud increasingly view Ankara as too closely aligned with his administration, particularly as disputes over elections, federal authority and the leadership of South West State have escalated into armed confrontation.

The most serious allegations concern reported Turkish air operations and the use of Turkish-supplied military equipment during the conflict in South West State. Local officials and forces aligned with former regional president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Lafta-Gareen have accused Türkiye of supporting federal operations and contributing to attacks that allegedly harmed civilians. These claims have not all been independently verified, and Türkiye’s government has rejected allegations that its military presence is intended to interfere in Somalia’s internal political affairs.

Nevertheless, the allegations have become politically consequential. Reports of protests against alleged airstrikes, including demonstrations in which residents burned a Turkish flag, suggest that anger over the conflict may be damaging Türkiye’s standing among some communities in South West State.

For critics, the distinction between supporting Somalia’s national security and supporting the political agenda of the incumbent administration is fundamental.

A military partnership intended to strengthen Somalia should not become associated with a domestic political struggle over who governs the country’s regions.

Training Soldiers Is Not the Same as Building National Security

Türkiye’s training programme has helped develop specialised Somali units, including Gorgor commandos. Ankara and Mogadishu maintain that such cooperation strengthens the Somali National Army and improves the country’s ability to confront genuine security threats.

But military capacity alone cannot guarantee national stability. The legitimacy of the institutions deploying that capacity matters just as much.

If trained units or foreign-supplied equipment are perceived to be used against political opponents or communities resisting federal intervention, the programme risks losing public confidence—even if its original purpose was legitimate.

Critics also contrast Türkiye’s increasingly visible military role with the roles played by Ethiopian and Kenyan forces in Somalia. They argue that Ankara’s alleged involvement in aerial operations has made its presence appear more directly connected to the country’s internal political struggle. That comparison and the conduct of all foreign forces should be judged on evidence, their mandates and their treatment of civilians.

The principle, however, is clear: foreign military assistance should protect the population, support lawful security operations and help create conditions for political stability. It should not be perceived as a means of deciding which Somali political faction prevails.

South West State Could Become a Turning Point

The conflict in South West State has become a critical test of Türkiye’s relationship with Somalia’s wider population.

Opponents of the Federal Government argue that Mogadishu’s intervention in the region undermined political consent and helped trigger a conflict that has caused civilian suffering and displacement. They further allege that Turkish military capabilities have supported federal operations against forces resisting the political transition.

The Federal Government has presented its operations as efforts to restore security and confront armed opponents. The competing claims underscore the need for independent scrutiny of alleged airstrikes, civilian casualties and the use of foreign-supplied equipment.

If Ankara wants to preserve its reputation as a partner of the Somali people, it must take such concerns seriously, explain its role clearly and ensure that its military assistance is not used unlawfully against civilians.

Silence or blanket denials will do little to reassure communities that believe they have been caught in a political and military confrontation beyond their control.

Ankara Has Put Too Much at Stake in One Relationship

A further risk for Türkiye is that its close relationship with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud could become vulnerable to Somalia’s changing political fortunes.

Many critics believe Ankara has placed too much of its political capital in its relationship with the incumbent administration. In their view, if Türkiye becomes identified primarily with one president rather than with Somalia as a whole, a change of leadership could expose the limits of that strategy.

This remains a political assessment, not a certainty. Türkiye’s relationship with Somalia extends beyond the presidency and includes defense agreements, economic interests, infrastructure projects and long-term institutional ties. The two countries’ defense cooperation, for example, includes a framework agreement signed in February 2024 to develop and support Somalia’s naval capabilities. <Cite refs={[“turn497686search11″,”turn497686search2”]}/>

Even so, a partnership built around a narrow set of political relationships can become fragile when those relationships are contested. If significant sections of the public come to associate Türkiye with partisan intervention, rebuilding trust could prove difficult regardless of who occupies the presidential palace.

Türkiye’s long-term interests are better served by maintaining relations with Somali institutions and communities across the political spectrum than by being seen as the military backer of one administration .

The Test of the 2027 Expansion

Türkiye’s proposed expansion of military training presents an opportunity to strengthen Somalia’s security institutions. But it also raises a question Ankara cannot avoid: how can it expand its military role without deepening public suspicions that it has become entangled in domestic politics?

The answer requires transparency, accountability and a clear separation between counterterrorism cooperation and political disputes. Allegations of civilian harm must be investigated credibly, and Somali security forces must be held to lawful standards in their use of military equipment and foreign assistance.

Somalia needs professional forces capable of defending its people against Al-Shabaab and other genuine security threats. It also needs political institutions that resolve disputes through constitutional and negotiated processes rather than force.

Türkiye can contribute to both objectives—but only if its conduct matches its stated commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and stability.

The ultimate measure of Türkiye’s partnership will not be the number of soldiers it trains in 2027. It will be whether Somali citizens believe that partnership makes them safer, protects their rights and serves the country as a whole.

If Ankara allows its relationship with the incumbent administration to overshadow those responsibilities, it risks sacrificing years of goodwill for the sake of a political alignment that may not endure.

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